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Abstract
In recent years, kidney paired donation has been extended to include living non-directed or
altruistic donors, in which an altruistic donor donates to the candidate of an incompatible donor-
candidate pair with the understanding that the donor in that pair will further donate to the candidate
of a second pair, and so on; such a process continues and thus forms an altruistic donor-initiated
chain. In this paper, we propose a novel strategy to sequentially allocate the altruistic donor (or
bridge donor) so as to maximize the expected utility; analogous to the way a computer plays chess,
the idea is to evaluate different allocations for each altruistic donor (or bridge donor) by looking
several moves ahead in a derived look-ahead search tree. Simulation studies are provided to
illustrate and evaluate our proposed method.
MSC: 62-Statistics; 90-Operations Research, Mathematical Programming.
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1. Introduction
For patients with end stage renal disease (ESRD), kidney transplantation is a preferred
treatment as compared with dialysis for it provides not only a longer survival but also a
better quality of life (Evans et al., 1985; Russell et al., 1992; Wolfe et al., 1999). Accord-
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ing to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), about 16,760
kidney transplants were performed per year from 2009 to 2012 in the U.S., while during
that same period of time the yearly average number of patients added to the waiting list
for kidney transplant surpassed 34,100. Part of this gap between supply and demand
can be attributed to the unfortunate fact that many patients with kidney failure recruit
willing organ donors who, upon evaluation, prove to be ABO blood type and/or Human
Leukocyte Antigens (HLA) incompatible. With regard to blood type compatibility, A
and B donors can donate to candidates of the same blood type or of type AB; AB
donors can donate only to AB candidates; and O donors, known as universal donors,
can donate to candidates of any blood type. The HLA incompatibility, on the other
hand, is due to the candidate having antibodies against the HLA antigens of a potential
donor resulting from prior exposure to donor antigens through pregnancy, transfusion
or previous transplant. Both forms of incompatibility can lead to a rapid rejection of the
transplanted organ and thus prohibit transplantation.
An evolving strategy, known as kidney paired donation (KPD) (Rapaport, 1986)
matches one donor-candidate pair to another pair with a complementary incompatibility,
such that the donor of the first pair donates to the candidate of the second, and vice
versa; see Figure 1-A and Figure 1-B for illustrations of a two-way exchange and a
three-way exchange. Although three-way or higher exchange cycles increase the chance
of identifying compatible matches, most KPD programs restrict exchanges to at most
three ways for two primary reasons. First, all surgical operations in a cycle must be
performed simultaneously to avoid the possibility that one of the donors may renege.
This requirement creates substantial logistical difficulties of scheduling, for example,
eight surgeons and eight operating rooms at the same time for a four-way exchange.
Second, the greater the length of an exchange cycle, the less likely the potential
transplants involved will actually occur, for the whole exchange cycle collapses if any
of the proposed transplants cannot proceed.
A fundamental problem in managing KPD programs lies in selecting the “optimal”
set of kidney exchanges from among the many possible alternatives. This problem has
been modeled and analyzed by economists using a game-theoretic approach (Roth et al.,
2004). More general approaches have been developed to tackle such a problem via an
integer programming (IP) formulation, first proposed by Roth et al. (2007); In this, each
Figure 1: (A): A two-way exchange; (B): A three-way exchange; (C): A NEAD chain.
Yijiang Li, Peter X.-K. Song, Alan B. Leichtman, Michael A. Rees and John D. Kalbfleisch 55
potential transplant was assigned equal weight, resulting in an allocation strategy that
enables the greatest number of transplants to be potentially implemented. Abraham et al.
(2007) adopted a more flexible weight assignment in this IP-based formulation and
further developed an algorithm to reduce the computational complexity of managing
large KPD programs. Li et al. (2013) considered a general utility-based evaluation
of potential kidney transplants. Moreover, they explicitly took into account inherent
uncertainties in managing KPD programs and exploited possible fall-back or contingent
exchanges when the originally planned allocation cannot be fully executed. In a data-
driven simulation system, they demonstrate that taking such additional elements into
consideration would yield improved allocation strategies.
In recent years, KPD has also been extended to include living non-directed donors
(LNDs), or altruistic donors; these are donors who have no designated candidates and
decide to donate voluntarily to a stranger. In this context, an altruistic donor may
donate to the candidate of an incompatible pair with the understanding that the donor
of that pair will become a bridge donor, and further donate to the candidate of a
second pair, and so on; such a process continues and thus forms an LND-initiated
chain. One advantage to such chains as compared to two-way or higher order exchange
cycles is that transplants along the chain do not need to be performed simultaneously
(Montgomery et al., 2006; Roth et al., 2006). As a consequence, the donor whose
incompatible candidate has received another donor’s kidney but has yet to donate could
donate later to another candidate; such donors are hence called “bridge donors”. For
this reason, this LND-initiated chain is sometimes called a non-simultaneous extended
altruistic donor (NEAD) chain (Rees et al., 2009). Figure 1-C illustrates a NEAD chain.
Kidneys from altruistic donors used to be designated to patients with no living donors
and who have therefore been placed on a deceased-donor waiting list. A NEAD chain,
however, allows for passing the altruism beyond saving just one patient, to potentially
benefitting several patients in the chain; the final donor in an NEAD chain could still
donate to the deceased-donor waiting list. The advantage of such chains has already
been demonstrated via simulation studies by Gentry et al. (2009) and Ashlagi et al.
(2011). In clinical practice, the standard way of incorporating LND and bridge donors
into the optimization of a KPD is to consider chains up to a given length along with
cycles in the optimization for each match run. Thus, at regular intervals, the KPD pool
is examined and a set of chains segments and/or a set of cycles are chosen using the
integer programming approach, and those chosen are implemented if possible.
In this paper, we consider a different strategy for developing a NEAD chain under
uncertainties in a KPD program with one altruistic donor. We also discuss in general
some possible extensions of this strategy to incorporate multiple altruistic donors.
Analogous to the way a computer plays chess, we propose an approach to sequentially
allocating an altruistic donor (or a bridge donor) so as to maximize the expected utility
over a certain given number of moves. The idea is to evaluate different allocation options
available for each altruistic donor (or bridge donor) by looking several moves ahead
along a derived look-ahead search tree. With these options in mind, we proceed with the
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next allocation of the altruistic or bridge donor that has the highest evaluation. This is
the first step in developing an approach that would alternate between optimizing the use
of LND and bridge donors and assigning cycles, each in an optimum way. This approach
would then be compared with the standard simultaneous maximization over chains and
cycles as described above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce a graph
representation for a KPD program with altruistic donors. With this representation, we
define the optimal policy in the context of managing a KPD program with one altruistic
donor. This optimal policy can be obtained in general by following a standard decision-
tree analysis, which we briefly illustrate in Section 3. The computation associated with
this decision-tree based approach, however, is very expensive for large KPD programs.
To address this issue, we propose, in Section 4, a more efficient and practical approach
which sequentially extends a NEAD chain according to the utility calculated along a
look-ahead search tree. Section 5 provides simulation studies to illustrate and evaluate
our proposed strategy. In Section 6, we conclude with some discussion on possible
extensions to incorporate multiple altruistic donors.
2. Problem formulation
In this section, we describe a graph representation for KPD programs that includes
incompatible pairs as well as altruistic donors. We then define the optimal policy in
the management of a KPD program with a single altruistic donor.
2.1. Graph representation
We represent a KPD program as a directed graph, G =(V ,E ), where the vertex set, V ≡
V (G ) = {1,2, · · · ,m,m+1, · · · ,n}, consists of m altruistic donors and n−m incompat-
ible donor-candidate pairs, where m ≤ n. We denote by, Va ≡ Va(G ) = {1,2, · · · ,m},
the collection of altruistic donors, and Vp ≡ Vp(G ) = V \Va, the set of incompatible
pairs. The edge set, E ≡ E (G ), is a binary relation on V , consisting of ordered pairs
of vertices in V . An edge from i to j, denoted as (i, j), implies that the donor in pair
i (or the altruistic donor i) is predicted to be compatible with the candidate in pair j.
Such a prediction is based on a virtual crossmatch test, which involves computer cross-
checking for blood type compatibility as well as comparing preexisting candidate an-
tibodies against donor HLA antigens. Before a predicted compatible transplant can be
further considered for an actual surgical operation, the compatibility must be confirmed
by a more labour-intensive laboratory crossmatch test to assure histocompatibility; this
involves incubating the serum of a candidate with the white blood cells of a prospective
donor. Figure 2 illustrates a graph representation for a two-way exchange, a three-way
exchange, and a NEAD chain, corresponding respectively to scenarios (A)-(C) in Fig-
ure 1.
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Figure 2: (A): A graph representation of a KPD program with a two-way exchange cycle, where
Vp = {1,2} and E = {(1,2),(2,1)}; (B): A graph representation of a KPD program with a three-way ex-
change cycle, where Vp = {1,2,3} and E = {(1,2),(2,3),(3,1)}; (C): A graph representation of a NEAD
chain, where Va = {1}, Vp = {2,3} and E = {(1,2),(2,3)}; donor 3 at the end of the chain becomes a
bridge donor.
The virtual crossmatch test is necessary because in practice the laboratory cross-
match test cannot be undertaken on all possibly compatible donors and candidates due
to labour and resource limitations. Further, even if the laboratory crossmatch result is
negative (non-reactive), an actual transplant operation may not occur due to other fric-
tion including, for example, refusal or illness or death of the candidate or the donor. To
incorporate such stochastic features, we associate with each edge, e = (i, j), a probabil-
ity (denoted as pe or pi j) that e, if chosen, could result in an actual transplant operation
(Li et al., 2013). Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the term “is viable” to indicate
that an edge could lead to an actual transplant.
In addition, we associate with each edge (or potential transplant) a general utility
(Li et al., 2013). Such utilities are often rule-based and determined by various attributes
such as degree of sensitization of the candidate against the potential donor pool, or time
since enrolment in the KPD. These utilities could also be based on predicted medical
outcomes such as the estimated graft or patient survival, or the incremental years of
recipient life that would accrue with a kidney transplant as opposed to a candidate’s
remaining on dialysis; see Wolfe et al. (2008). For each potential transplant e = (i, j),
we denote such an assigned utility as ue or ui j.
In this paper, our attention is not on the estimation of edge utilities and probabilities.
It is worth noting though that research along this line is important and needed in the
practical management of a KPD program; see more discussion on this aspect in Wolfe
et al. (2008), Schaubel et al. (2009), and Li et al. (2013).
2.2. The optimal policy
One difficulty with selecting a long NEAD chain and then arranging transplants accord-
ingly is that in practice this long chain can rarely be fully implemented. This is because
the chain would break as soon as one transplant cannot proceed as planned. In this paper,
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we propose to extend a NEAD chain sequentially in a near optimal way by selecting one
potential transplant recipient at a time. In subsequent discussion, we note how this can
be used as the basis of more general approaches.
Consider a KPD program with only one altruistic donor, i.e. m = 1 and Va = {1}.
This naturally implies (i,1) /∈ E for all i ∈ V , as altruistic donors don’t have designated
candidates. For j ∈ V such that j = 1 or (1, j) ∈ E , let G ( j) ≡ (V j,E j) be a subgraph
of G = (V ,E ), where
V j = {v ∈ V : v is accessible from j},
E j = {(v1,v2) ∈ E : v1 ∈ V j,v2 ∈ V j,v2 6= j}.
In this paper, a vertex j is said to be accessible from a vertex i if i = j or if there exists
a set of edges in E , denoted as {(ik, ik+1),k = 0,1, · · · ,n} such that i0 = i and in+1 = j.
In general terms, G ( j) represents the resulting KPD graph if the transplant according to
(1, j) ∈ E is arranged and j becomes a bridge donor.
Managing a KPD program with one altruistic donor could then be viewed as a
sequential decision problem, in which we start with U = 0 and G = G (1), and then
repeat the following steps until |V (G )|= 1:
1. choose one edge from A ≡ {(1, j) : (1, j) ∈ E }, say (1,b).
2. if (1,b) is viable, update
U ←U +u1b,
G ← G (b),
1 ← b;
if (1,b) is not viable, update the KPD pool
G ← G−b(1), where G−b = (V ,E \{(1,b)}) .
Step (i) is carried out to implement a policy that would be used to manage the KPD
program by specifying what action from A to take at each loop; two sample policies are,
b = argmax
j:(1, j)∈A
u1 j
b = argmax
j:(1, j)∈A
u1 j p1 j.
These correspond to greedy algorithms that look at the next step only and manage to
optimize the utility or the expected utility of that step. They may, of course, be very
poor strategies since they ignore any subsequent implications of possible next steps.
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Figure 3: (A): A KPD program G with one altruistic donor and four incompatible pairs as well as various
subgraphs of G ; (B): A standard decision tree analysis for a KPD program G as in (A), with squares
representing decision nodes and circles indicating chance nodes; the decision node G3 (which is shaded)
appears twice in the tree and hence is only drawn once.
For any given policy on G = (V ,E ), the value of U after the algorithm terminates
can be interpreted as the cumulative claimed utility. This value, which we denote by U∞,
is random; and its expectation could be used to evaluate the policy from which it arose.
Among all policies defined in the above way, the optimal policy refers to the one that
attains the highest value of E(U∞). This way of defining the optimal policy provides a
formal framework that will prove convenient in later discussions, even though in general
one can rarely follow this optimal policy through until the iterative procedure ends. This
is an important issue, arising due to various practical concerns, that we will revisit in
Section 4.2.
Figure 3-A provides an illustrative example, where G represents a KPD program
with four incompatible pairs (vertices 2, 3, 4 and 5) and one altruistic donor (vertex
1). Starting from G , the action space is A = {(1,2),(1,3)} and suppose we proceed by
selecting (1,2). If it is viable, this would lead to G (2), denoted as G9 in Figure 3-A,
and the resulting value of U∞ is u12; if (1,2) is not viable, we end up with G1, at which
the updated action space becomes A = {(1,3)}. We then continue by selecting (1,3),
and if it is not viable, we stop at G2; if (1,3) is viable, we then proceed to G3, at which
the updated action space becomes A = {(3,4),(3,5)}; and we continue this process by
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selecting one allocation from A. In this paper, we assume that edges in a KPD graph have
an independence relationship. Though this assumption can be relaxed, it is a reasonable
one when pair withdrawal (due to factors such as pregnancy, illness, or death) does not
occur frequently; see Li et al. (2013) for related discussion.
3. Decision tree analysis for KPD
The optimal policy introduced in the previous section can be obtained by conducting a
standard decision tree analysis, which we briefly illustrate below using a small example.
The computation associated with such an analysis, however, can be rather complicated
for large problems. We will return to this computational issue in Section 4, and present
an alternative and more efficient approach to analyzing policies and optimizing the
allocations. Note that a general mathematical framework derived from theories of
Markov decision processes (MDPs) can be used to rigorously formulate the problem
of managing KPD programs with altruistic donors (Li, 2012). However, solving for the
optimal policy is computationally dificult for large or even moderate KPD problems,
which poses a serious impediment to the development of practical algorithms based on
this MDP framework. We briefly describe the MDP formulation in this section by using
a particular example. In Section 4, we describe an alternative and more efficient way of
analyzing the KPD that takes account of the fall-back options.
The structure of G in Figure 3-A cannot be used directly for a standard decision
tree analysis due to the existence of various fall-back options; for example, if edge
(1,3) is selected but not viable, we could fall back to (1,2). The complete analysis
is instead provided by a derived decision tree (oriented from left to right) as shown in
Figure 3-B, where squares represent decision nodes and circles indicate chance nodes.
Each decision node is followed in this tree by a fixed number of chance nodes associated
with all actions available at that decision node. Each chance node is then followed by
two decision nodes corresponding to the two possible outcomes of choosing that chance
node: one outcome is that the chosen transplant e ∈ E is viable, resulting in a utility of
ue, whereas the other is that e is not viable, for which zero utility is generated. These two
utilities are associated with the edges from the chance node to the two corresponding
decision nodes. For example, in Figure 3-B, starting from the decision node G , two
actions are available, either arrange a transplant according to edge (1,2) leading to
chance node a or according to edge (1,3) leading to chance node e. In the case where
(1,2) is chosen, associated with the chance node a are two possible outcomes, G1 and
G9, which occur with probabilities 1− p12 and p12 respectively. If G9 occurs, we claim
a utility of u12, and zero utility is generated if G1 occurs, for which we continue on this
analysis from chance node b.
The expected value (EV) associated with a chance node or a decision node is
calculated alternately in a backward direction along the tree from the right to the left.
Precisely, (i) the EV at a leaf decision node is 0 (this could be set to some non-zero
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number to represent the potential value associated with the corresponding bridge donor;
see more discussion on this in Section 6); (ii) the EV at a chance node is computed by
taking a weighted average of the sums of the utilities along the edges originating at this
chance node and the EVs at the corresponding successor decision nodes; (iii) the EV at
a non-leaf decision node is calculated by taking the maximum of the EVs of its children
nodes.
For example, in Figure 3-B, the EVs at decision nodes G5 and G8 are EV [G5] =
EV [d] = p35u35 and EV [G8] = EV [h] = p34u34 respectively. The EVs at chance nodes
c and g are EV [c] = p34u34 +(1− p34)EV [G5] and EV [g] = p35u35 +(1− p35)EV [G8]
respectively. This indicates that EV [c] ≥ EV [g] if and only if u34 ≥ u35, and the action
taken at G3 is therefore (3,4) or (3,5) depending on which one has the larger edge utility.
The EV at node G3 is then calculated as
EV [G3] = max{EV [c],EV [g]}
= max{p34u34 +(1− p34)p35u35, p35u35 +(1− p35)p34u34}. (1)
After computing EVs associated with all decision and chance nodes in this way, the
optimal policy at each decision node is to adopt the action associated with the chance
node that has the maximum EV. This procedure starts from the root decision node, that
is from the altruistic donor.
4. A look-ahead search tree-based strategy
The structure of the derived decision tree in Figure 3-B is much more complicated than
the structure of G itself in Figure 3-A. As a result, the standard decision tree analysis as
introduced in Section 3 results in substantial computational difficulties when the KPD
graph is large. In this section, we address this issue by presenting a more efficient and
practical approach that relies on evaluating different allocations for each altruistic donor
(or bridge donor) according to a derived look-ahead search tree.
4.1. Identifying the optimal policy via a search tree
Consider first a KPD program, G = (V ,E ), where Va = {1},Vp = {2,3, · · · ,n}, and
E = {(1, i) : i = 2,3, · · · ,n}. Without loss of generality, assume u12 ≥ u13 ≥ ·· · ≥ u1n.
For this specific KPD program, the optimal policy to follow at G is to try transplant
(1,2), and if it fails then try (1,3), then (1,4) and so forth. The associated EV of this
policy is
EV [G ] =
n
∑
k=2
{
u1k p1k
k−1
∏
i=2
(1− p1i)
}
. (2)
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Based on this fact, we could then select the optimal action to take from G directly and
hence avoid explicitly constructing a decision tree and calculating the EV associated
with each node of the tree, as would be required for the standard decision analysis
in Section 3. This observation is very useful as we can see, for example, by applying
formula (2) at the decision node G3 in Figure 3-B. This would lead to the optimal action
of taking (3,4) or (3,5) depending on which one has the larger utility; and the EV at G3
is therefore computed as
EV [G3] = 1[u34≥u35] {p34u34 +(1− p34)p35u35}+1[u34<u35] {p35u35 +(1− p35)p34u34} .
(3)
Note that formula (3) is exactly equal to the one calculated via a standard decision
analysis as in formula (1), but this latter approach requires calculating EVs at additional
nodes G5 and G8.
Consider now a KPD program, G = (V ,E ), where Va = {1}, let A≡{(1, j) : (1, j)∈
E } and u∗1 j ≡ u1 j +EV [G ( j)], for all (1, j) ∈ A. Without loss of generality, we assume
A = {(1, j) : j = 2,3, · · · , l} and u∗12 ≥ u∗13 ≥ ·· · ≥ u∗1l . Then the optimal decision to take
at G is to attempt transplant (1,2); and if it fails, try (1,3) and then (1,4), and so on; the
associated EV is
EV [G ] =
l
∑
k=2
{
p1ku∗1k
k−1
∏
i=2
(1− p1i)
}
. (4)
Based on this result, we could evaluate various choices in A by u∗1 j and then proceed
with the one having the largest value. We repeatedly apply this procedure from terminal
nodes up to sequentially form a NEAD chain, with formula (4) evaluating the expected
utility in this process.
To identify the optimal action to take at G , we recursively apply formula (4), which
in fact does not require calculating EVs associated with all decision nodes and chance
nodes, but only a fraction of them. These required nodes can then be organized according
to their dependence relationship as in (4) to form a search tree. In this tree, the node on
the left hand side of (4) is the parent while the nodes on the right hand side denote
children; and edges connecting them represent the corresponding actions. The structure
of this tree therefore allows us to compute EVs associated with its nodes recursively in
a backward manner from the leaf nodes to the root.
Figure 4 provides an example of a search tree and illustrates calculating EVs
associated with its nodes; the search tree in this figure only involves 5 nodes, much
less than that of the decision tree in Figure 3-B. The optimal action to take at G in this
example is edge (1,3) if u∗12 = u12 is smaller than u∗13 = u13 +EV [G3] or edge (1,2) if
otherwise; the EV at G is therefore computed as
EV [G ] = 1[u∗13≥u∗12] {p13u
∗
13 +(1− p13)p12u∗12}+1[u∗13<u∗12] {p12u
∗
12 +(1− p12)p13u∗13} .
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Figure 4: A search tree-based analysis for a KPD program G .
Clearly, the decision analysis of this search tree is much simpler than that from a
standard decision tree as in Figure 3-B, although both lead to the same result.
In general, the search tree associated with a KPD program can be constructed by an
algorithm based on the classic depth-first search (DFS). We developed such an algorithm
that also computes the EVs while performing a DFS on the KPD graph. The optimal
policy is then determined by the following iterative algorithm:
1. for G = (V ,E ), construct the corresponding search tree by following a DFS-based
algorithm, and compute the EV associated with each node of this search tree; this
is done recursively from the terminal nodes up to the root node.
2. update the current action space A ≡ {(1, j) : (1, j) ∈ E (G )}, and calculate u∗1 j =
u1 j +EV [G ( j)] for (1, j) ∈ A.
3. choose (1,b) ∈ A with b = argmax j:(1, j)∈A u∗1 j.
4. if (1,b) is viable, update
G ← G (b), i.e. update the KPD graph,
1 ← b, i.e. set the bridge donor b as the new altruistic donor;
if (1,b) is not viable, update the KPD pool
G ← G−b(1), where G−b = (V ,E \{(1,b)}) .
5. go back to (ii) until |V (G )|= 1.
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For completeness, we also briefly describe here a slightly more complicated example
in which the KPD itself is not a tree (as it is in Figure 3-A above). The KPD in this
example is obtained by adding edges (2,4) and (4,3) to the KPD graph G in Figure 3-
A. Note that vertex 4 can be reached in two distinct ways and gives rise to two distinct
subgraphs. Specifically, if (1,3) and (3,4) are transplanted, G (4) only has vertex 4; if
(1,2) and (2,4) are transplanted, G (4) has vertices 4 and 3 and also contains edge (4,3).
4.2. A depth-k search tree
Although the search tree-based approach allows for a much more efficient analysis than
does a standard decision tree analysis, constructing such a search tree is computationally
very expensive for a general large KPD graph; in fact, the computation is extensive even
without the effort entailed in computing EVs associated with nodes along that tree. This
unfortunate fact poses a substantial difficulty in identifying the optimal policy when the
KPD program is large.
Further, a more important issue is that the optimal policy (even if it could be
computed) would most likely not be implementable in practice. This is mainly because
the practical process of initiating and extending a NEAD chain would require a relatively
long period of time, during which the KPD pool would constantly be updated and
evolve as new pairs arrive and/or existing pairs withdraw or candidates die; in addition,
candidates in the pool may also be transplanted via exchanges among incompatible pairs
or deceased donor kidneys from the waiting list, since these would typically be arranged
in parallel with the NEAD chain mechanism. Thus, assessing strategies by looking a
long way down the tree from the root node is often not that useful in practice.
To address such problems, we propose to proceed by first deriving a subtree, which
we call a depth-k search tree, from the original search tree. Such a subtree can be readily
obtained by the same DFS-based algorithm as introduced in Section 4.1, by simply
restricting the depth of the search from the root node to k. We then follow the recursive
relationship as in formula (4) to calculate the EVs associated with corresponding nodes
in the subtree, beginning this calculation from the leaf nodes at depth k and working
up through the tree to the root node. The EV of a leaf node is set to zero or some
reasonable measurement of the value of the corresponding bridge donor (see Section 6
for more discussion). At this stage the iterative procedure presented in Section 4.1 can
be applied, but with one modification that – if the chosen action (1,b) is viable, we
regenerate a depth-k search tree rooted at G (b) and compute EVs associated with the
nodes of this new tree.
Instead of the optimality that exists only in a rather idealized scenario, the policy
obtained from the depth-k search tree provides a more practical evaluation of potential
bridge donors and a greatly reduced computational complexity. Further, our simulation
results (see Section 5) suggest that the allocation strategy derived from a search tree
performs reasonably well for a moderate depth of, say, 3 or 4. It is useful to note that
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this strategy is feasible in the context of the search tree approach of this section, but
would still be very complicated to implement using the standard decision tree analysis;
for example, the depth-1 search tree constructed according to formula (2) provides the
same analysis as the one via a standard decision tree of depth 2n+1.
5. Simulation studies
So far in this paper, we have explored a look-ahead search tree-based approach to
manage a KPD program with one altruistic donor. This approach sequentially extends a
NEAD chain by selecting one potential bridge donor at a time, taking into consideration
the operational uncertainties and the long-term consequences associated with various
possible selections. In this section, we provide simulation results of applying such an
allocation strategy to manage a simulated KPD program.
5.1. Simulating incompatible pairs and altruistic donors
We simulate incompatible pairs and altruistic donors as in Li et al. (2013). For an
incompatible pair, we simulate its candidate and donor separately from their own
population distributions. Candidates are sampled at random (with replacement) from a
database of incompatible pairs, which is derived from the University of Michigan KPD
program. This database currently consists of 115 transplant candidates, each having
at least one willing but incompatible donor. We are in the process of incorporating
additional databases from other KPD programs for the purpose of reflecting a broader
candidate variation. On the other hand, donors are simulated by sampling their blood
types and HLA haplotypes respectively. Blood type is drawn from its U.S. population
distribution: O, 44%; A, 42%; B, 10%; and AB, 4% (Stanford Blood Center, 2010), and
HLA haplotypes are sampled according to a population frequency table derived from a
public database on potential bone marrow donors (Maiers et al., 2007).
We consider a simulated donor-candidate pair as an incompatible pair, and hence
include it in the KPD pool, if either their blood types mismatch or the donor’s HLA
haplotypes overlap with some of the candidate’s antibody specificities. Finally, an
altruistic donor is generated in the same way as we have described above for generating
a donor in an incompatible pair.
5.2. Simulation setup
In Section 2.1, each potential transplant (which is predicted to be compatible by a
virtual crossmatch test) is assigned a probability to reflect the inherent uncertainty in
the system and a general utility to quantify the rule-based or outcome-based evaluation
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of that potential transplant. As we have mentioned, estimation of these probabilities
and utilities is an important aspect in the practical management of a KPD program.
This also forms an independent line of research in parallel with the work of developing
KPD allocation strategies. For illustrative purpose, our approach here is to obtain these
utilities and probabilities according to certain simplified probability distributions, and
then use them to study the method proposed in Section 4.2.
We perform a total of 3,000 simulations. In all simulations, edge probabilities are
generated from a uniform distribution, U(0.1,0.5), which suggests an average success
rate of 30% for a predicted compatible (by virtual crossmatch test) transplant. This rate
is in line with the early experience at the University of Michigan KPD program and the
Alliance for Paired Donation, though current success rate are somewhat higher. For edge
utilities, we fix them at 1 for 1,000 simulations, draw them from uniform U(10,20) and
U(10,30) respectively for the remaining 2,000 simulations (with 1,000 each). For each
simulation, we execute an allocation strategy based on a depth-k search tree for k equal
to 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. We then record important performance measures such
as cumulative claimed utilities and cumulative number of transplants. Note that when k
is equal to 1, the allocation strategy simply corresponds to selecting, among all possible
choices available for the altruistic donor, the one that has the largest edge utility.
5.3. Simulation results
First, we report on the cumulative number of transplants achieved in simulated KPD
programs with one altruistic donor and 100 incompatible donor-candidate pairs. We
compare the average number of transplants across different values of k and under the
three utility generating distributions. Table 1 provides summary comparison, in which
we observe a consistent pattern where the number of transplants performed increases
with k. This is true regardless of which distribution is used to generate edge utilities.
Table 1: Summary of the average number of transplants performed (denoted by N) and the average
cumulative utilities claimed (denoted by U∞), by implementing a depth-k search tree-based allocation
strategy on a simulated KPD program with one altruistic donor and 100 incompatible pairs. Edge
utilities are generated from U(1,1), U(10,20), and U(10,30); and edge probabilities are generated from
U(0.1,0.5). The summary is calculated over 3,000 rounds of simulations, with 1,000 simulations for each
utility generating distribution. Note that for the choice U(1,1), the claimed utility equals the number of
completed transplants.
ue = 1 ue ∼U(10,20) ue ∼U(10,30)
depth-k mean N mean N mean U∞ mean N mean U∞
k = 1 3.16 3.18 55.99 3.18 80.22
k = 2 8.17 6.65 112.21 6.19 149.58
k = 3 8.70 7.87 128.93 7.63 176.78
k = 4 8.74 8.26 133.54 7.99 181.92
k = 5 8.89 8.41 134.45 8.29 185.43
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Table 2: Three correlation matrices for the total number of transplants performed in a depth-k search tree-
based allocation strategy across different values of k. The entry at the ith row and the jth column represents
the correlation between the total number of transplants when k = i and that when k = j when managing the
same simulated KPD program (with one altruistic donor and 100 incompatible pairs). Matrix on the left:
ue = 1; matrix in the middle: ue ∼U(10,20); matrix on the right: ue ∼U(10,30).
1 .34 .34 .33 .31
− 1 .67 .67 .66
− − 1 .79 .73
− − − 1 .81
− − − − 1
1 .27 .29 .26 .29
− 1 .50 .51 .48
− − 1 .66 .58
− − − 1 .72
− − − − 1
1 .29 .27 .29 .29
− 1 .46 .48 .48
− − 1 .58 .57
− − − 1 .72
− − − − 1
Another observation is that the extra benefit in the number of transplants through
increasing k is diminishing as k gets large. For example, when edge utilities are
generated from U(10,20), increasing the value of k from 1 to 4 would almost triple the
total number of transplants (on average from 3.18 to 8.26); however, further increasing
k (from 4 to 5) appears to have very limited effects.
In terms of comparing the cumulative claimed utility, Table 1 also demonstrates
similar patterns to those observed above for comparing the number of transplants. These
results suggest that k = 3 or 4 would provide a satisfactory solution in practice. Further
investigation, however, with data from more KPD programs would be useful. Notice
that when edge utilities are fixed at 1, the cumulative claimed utility is the same as the
cumulative number of transplants.
Finally, we take a look at the correlation matrix among five variables; each variable
represents the number of transplants performed when k is equal to each one of the five
values. We anticipate that the correlation between variable 4 (the number of transplants
achieved when k = 4) and variable 5 would be higher than the correlation between
variable 1 and variable 5. Table 2 exactly unveils such a pattern in three correlation
matrices (with each one corresponding to one utility generating distribution). Similar
observations are also noted in the correlation matrices for the cumulative claimed utility.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied the problem of managing a KPD program with one
altruistic donor. One important yet challenging part of this problem is to recognize
various friction (as discussed in Section 2.1) inherent in the system and to guide the
decision-making process by taking into account these uncertainties. Realizing the fact
that a long pre-specified NEAD chain in practice can almost never be implemented
as planned, we propose to initiate and extend such a chain in a sequential way by
selecting potential transplant recipients one at a time. Each selection is made keeping
in mind the associated long-term consequences so as to maximize the expected gain
over a certain given number of moves. In order to do this efficiently and practically, we
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construct a depth-k search tree for a KPD graph using a DFS-based algorithm. We then
evaluate various choices available for each altruistic donor (or bridge donor) according
to the calculation performed along that search tree, and recommend the choice with the
greatest expected utility.
In the process of extending a NEAD chain, the bridge donor at the end of the current
chain might be incompatible with a majority of the candidate population, which would
significantly prolong the waiting time for that bridge donor to be matched with a present
or future candidate. Furthermore, this long waiting time for the hard-to-match bridge
donor may make him/her more likely to withdraw from the KPD pool and so terminate
the NEAD chain. To partially avoid this unfortunate circumstance, some KPD programs
have not allowed a blood type AB donor to become a bridge donor. Actually, this
issue can be partially addressed in our proposed sequential allocation strategy, which
incorporates the long-term consequences associated with each pair choice, and would
in general tend to avoid choices that could lead to a hard-to-match bridge donor. As we
have briefly mentioned in Section 3 and Section 4.2, one way to further address this
issue is to assign each possible bridge donor a reasonable base utility. This base utility
represents the potential “contribution” from a bridge donor; a hard-to-match bridge
donor would be assigned a small base utility and an easy-to-match one would be given
a larger value.
Although this paper has focused on managing a KPD program with one altruistic
donor, the proposed approach can be generalized to incorporate multiple altruistic
donors. One way to achieve this is to construct a depth-k search tree for each altruistic
donor and use this tree to evaluate various allocations options available for that altruistic
donor according to the method in Section 4.2. Among all allocations possible for these
altruistic donors, we select a disjoint collection such that the overall expected utility
can be maximized. More specifically, let Va ≡ {1,2, · · · ,m} be m altruistic donors in a
general KPD program. We denote by A ≡ ∪mi=1{(i, j) ∈ E } the possible allocations
available for these m altruistic donors. Each potential transplant, (i, j) ∈ A , can be
evaluated by its expected utility, which is calculated as u∗i j = ui j +EV [G[i]( j)], where
G[i] ≡ G (i). We then select from A a disjoint collection of edges (or transplants), in
the sense that no two edges can share a common vertex, so as to maximize the sum
of expected utilities. For those selected transplants, viable ones would result in actual
operations and generate new bridge donors, and altruistic donors and incompatible pairs
involved in non-viable transplants are recycled back to the KPD pool.
The above way of allocating multiple altruistic donors can be arranged in parallel
with the selection of exchange sets (or cycles) among incompatible pairs. Let Sr be
the collection of all exchange sets of size up to r among (n−m) incompatible pairs (Li
et al., 2013). Typically, in clinical KPD programs, one chooses r = 3, although larger
exchanges could be considered as well. For each S ∈Sr, let EUS represent its expected
utility and let YS be a decision variable equal to 1 if S is selected and 0 if not; for each
(i, j) ∈ A , Zi j is another decision variable whose value is 1 if (i, j) is chosen for a
transplant and 0 otherwise; the expected utility of this potential transplant (i, j) is given
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by u∗i j as discussed above. By adopting a formulation that is similar to the one proposed
in Li et al. (2013), we then manage such a KPD program by solving the following IP
problem:
max
{YS},{Zi j}
{
∑
S∈Sr
YSEUS + ∑
(i, j)∈A
Zi ju∗i j
}
, (5)
subject to ∑
S∈Sr(l)
YS + ∑
(i, j)∈A (l)
Zi j ≤ 1,∀l ∈ V , (6)
where, in (6), Sr(l) represents the exchange sets in Sr that contain l and A (l) similarly
denotes a subset of transplants in A that involve l. Various extensions of this approach
would be possible to allow fall back options for the exchanges and for the assignment of
the altruistic donors. Such approaches are discussed in Li et al. (2013). This approach,
and extensions of it, provide an alternative to the simultaneous selection of chains and
cycles as is traditionally done in the match runs of a KPD; see for example, Roth et al.
(2006), Gentry et al. (2009), and Ashlagi et al. (2011).
The mechanism of a NEAD chain allows the altruism from a single altruistic
donor to benefit a potentially large number of patients, but it does so exclusively for
patients recruiting a willing but incompatible living donor. This mechanism excludes
patients without a designated living donor and who are therefore placed on a deceased-
donor waiting list. Among those patients who would benefit from this NEAD chain,
approximately 73% of them are white; whereas those who would not benefit from this
mechanism form a 52% non-white population (Segev et al., 2008). On the other hand,
not all altruistic (or bridge) donors are well suited for initiating and extending chains
among a pool of incompatible pairs. For example, consider a KPD pool in which an
altruistic donor may not be in a good position (because of either incompatibility or
poor utility) to be matched up with any candidate. In this case, rather than placing this
altruistic donor in a waiting “mode” for a potentially long time, redirecting him/her to a
deceased-donor waiting list, where a compatible patient with potentially good transplant
outcomes might be identified rather easily, appears a more suitable alternative.
To decide whether an altruistic donor is better off initiating a NEAD chain or
donating directly to someone on a deceased-donor waiting list, we could evaluate an
altruistic donor by the utility expected to be achieved if this donor is chosen to initiate
a chain. To be precise, we may first perform the calculation according to formula
(4) as in Section 4.1 to evaluate the expected utility for each altruistic donor, i.e.
{EV [G (i)] : i ∈ Va}. The result from this evaluation could then be used to assess the
suitability of assigning each altruistic donor to a deceased-donor waiting list; a relatively
high value of EV [G (i)] would recommend reserving altruistic donor i for extending a
NEAD chain while a comparatively low value of EV [G (i)] would indicate a transplant
to someone waiting for a deceased-donor kidney. It is worth noting that different ways
of assigning edge utilities and probabilities could be adopted in calculating {EV [G (i)]
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: i ∈ Va}. This would provide extra benefit in allowing more control over what kidneys
in general are distributed to a deceased-donor waiting list. For example, if each edge is
assigned an equal utility while the edge probability remains representing the likelihood
of that edge being viable, then altruistic (or bridge) donors who are less compatible with
candidates in the current KPD pool would be more likely to be directed to a deceased-
donor waiting list. In addition to evaluating an altruistic donor against the current KPD
pool, it is often rational in practice to perform the evaluation against the deceased-donor
waiting list. For example, Blood Type O or B candidates frequently wait a year or
more longer on the deceased-donor waiting list before receiving a kidney transplant
than do Blood Type A or AB candidates. Therefore a Blood Type O or B altruistic or
bridge donor might be argued to have higher utility. So might someone who matches
to a pediatric candidate. Similarly an altruistic or bridge donor that might match to a
sensitized wait-listed candidate might have a higher utility, but a lower probability of
progressing to transplant.
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